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The Use of Forestry Incentives by
Nonindustrial Forest Landowner
Groups: Is It Time for a Reassessment

of Where We Spend Our Tax Dollars?"
ABSTRACT

Nonindustrial private forest (NIPF) landowner behavior,
particularlyreforestationbehavior,has been deemed inadequatefor
meeting societal demands for timber over the past several decades.
Various forestry incentive programs have been initiated to
stimulateforest management, reforestationand afforestationefforts
on nonindustrialforest lands in the face of real price appreciation,
and concerns about inadequatelong-term timber supply. Incentive
programs include tax investment creditsand early amortizationof
reforestationcosts and directassistance(cost-share)programssuch
as the ForestIncentives Program(FIP),the StewardshipIncentives
Program(SIP), and the ConservationReserve Program (CRP). The
tacit assumption underlying these programs is that planted trees
and improved forests will eventually lead to increased timber
harvestfrom subsidized lands. Recent evidence suggests that this
has not happened. Based on a survey and subsequent analysis of
2,400 Arkansas NIPF landowners,it appears that timber managers
would engage in forestry practices regardless of assistance
payments. While other landowners might take offered assistance
payments, no additional timber is forthcoming from them. The
result is that timber managersenjoy a subsidy and higherinternal

rates of return on their investments while producing no additional
timber.Landowners who arenot classified asforest managers, but
who take assistance payments, enjoy a free gift but produce no
additional timberfor sale. Incentive policies need to be carefully
reviewed.
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INTRODUCTION
Public intervention in the economy is considered when individual
private goals or practices fall short of meeting societal goals or are
inconsistent with societal goals. Nonindustrial private forest (NIPF)
landowner behavior, particularly reforestation behavior, has been deemed
inadequate for meeting societal demands for timber over the past several
decades.' For over 70 years we have asked the question, "Why do some
landowners not invest in reforestation or forest management?" Numerous
studies suggest that incompatible ownership objectives, forest tract
fragmentation, land use conversion, and lack of forest management
knowledge are but a few of the obstacles to landowner investment in
reforestation and timber management.2 The answer to the 70 year-old
question is crucial as the forest industry looks toward nonindustrial private
forest lands to provide an increasing proportion of the nation's wood and
fiber supply?
As early as 1924, legislation was passed under the Clarke-McNary
Act 4 that promoted reforestation and forest management on private lands.5
Other federal and state programs followed. The goals of two key programs
of the 1930s and 1950s, the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) and
the Conservation Reserve Program (the Soil Bank), were to retire highly
erodible farmlands from production by planting them to either trees or

1. See generally A.D. Folweiver & H.J. Vaux, Private Forest Land Ownership and
Management in the Loblolly-Shortleaf Type of Louisiana, 42 J.FORESTRY 783 (1944); ROBERT W.
MCDERMID E"AL, US. DEP'T OP AGRICULTURE, FORT SrSEtvIcE BUuEzr No. 520, OWNERSHIP
FACIORS AFFBCING MANAGEMmN OF SMALL WooDLANDS IN ST. HELENA PARISH, LOUISIANA

(1959); Albert C. Worrel & Lloyd C. Irland, Alternative Means ofMotivating Investment in Private
Industry, 73 J.FORESTRY 206 (1975).
2. See generallyJohn C. Bliss &Mark J.Grassl, PredictingTimber Harvestson PrivateForests
in Southwest Wismsin, 4 N. J.APPLIED FOResR 152 (1987); Richard L.Porterfield & James E.
Moak, Timber Managementfor NonindustrialForestOwners, 3 S. J.APPu FORE9Y 2 (1977).
3. Seegenerally Richard A. Kluender, Implications for the Forest Products Industry, (May
30-31,1997) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Arkansas Forestry Forum, Little Rock,
Arkansas, on file with the University of New Mexico Law School Library).
4. Act of June 7,1924, Pub. L No. 270, ch. 348, § 9,43 Stat. 653,655 repealed by Act of
Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L No. 94-579, Title VII, § 704(a). 90 Stat. 2792. Section (a) of this act
authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to cooperate with land grant colleges and universities
and state agencies to aid farmers and small forest landowners in the production and
distribution of seeds and seedlings for the creation, maintenance, and utilization of woodlots,
shelterbelts, windbreaks, and other growth.
5. See Frederick W. Cubbage & David N. Wear, Can Nonindustrial Private Forest
Landowners Make Up the Shortfall in Timber Productionfrom National Forests? in SOC'Y AMEL.
FORESTERS NAT'L CONVENTION PROC. 421,421-26 (1993).
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permanent pasture.6 Funding for forestry practices under the ACP declined
during the 1960s, prompting forestry interest groups to lobby Congress for
a separate cost share program for forestry practices! These efforts resulted
in the Forestry Incentives Program (PIP).6 These programs were initiated
to stimulate forest management, reforestation and afforestation efforts on
nonindustrial forest lands in the face of real price appreciation and
concerns about inadequate long-term timber supply.' The tacit assumption
underlying these programs was that planted trees and improved forests
would eventually lead to increased timber harvest from subsidized lands.
Recent evidence suggests that in the face of demand shifting toward nontimber forest outputs by nonindustrial landowners, this assumption was

specious."0
Several million acres have been planted to trees as a result of
landowner participation in FIP and SIP." Some research in the 1980s
suggested that nearly 50 percent of total tree planting accomplished on
nonindustrial lands can be attributed to federal cost-share programs and
that the increase in productivity would amount to almost 1.3 billion cubic
feet over the first rotation.u Thus, while several studies suggest that

6. See Soil Conservation & Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, ch. 104, § 7(a), 49 Stat 48
(codified at 16 U.S.C. 590(e)-590(g) (1994)) (establishing the Agricultural Conservation

Program to promote resource conservation practices on farms); Soil Bank Act ch.327, § 102,
70 Stat. 188,188 (1956) repealedby Act of Nov. 3,1965, Pub. L. No. 89-321, Title VI, § 601,79

Stat. 1206. The goal of the Soil Bank Act was to withdraw land from agricultural production
for conservation use, which was later incorporated into the Food Security Act of 1985, §1252,
16 U.S.C. 2005 (1994) 16 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (1994).
7. The Forestry Incentive Program (FIP) and other forestry stewardship incentive
programs were established in 1972 in 16 U.S.C. § 2103(b) (1994).
8. Agriculture & Consumer Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L No. 93-86,1973 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(87 Stat.) 45. The 1974 Forestry Incentives Program of P.L. 93-86 authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to share the cost of forestry practices with non-industrial private forest
landowners. The program is administered at county level by the US. Department of
Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service.
9. See FREDERICK W. CUBBAGE ET AL, FOREST RESOURCE POUCY,457.60, (1993).
10. See Richard A. Kluender & John L Greene, Economic OptimizationofPolitialDeions,
in U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC.,SO-79, PROC. OF THE SOUTHERN FOREST ECONOMICS WORKSHOP ON
EVALUATING EVEN AND ALL-AGED TIMBER MANAGEMENT OvToNs FOR SOUrHERN FOREST
LANDS 143 (1990); Richard A. Kluender & Tamara L Walkingstick, Rethinking How
Nonindustrial Landowners View Their Lands (1998) (unpublished manuscript on file with
the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
11. See W.B. Kurtz et al., Retention, Condition,and land-Use Aspects of Tree Plantingunder
Federal Forest Programs in MINNESOTA EENSION SERVICE, UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA,
SYMPOSIUM ON NONINDUSTRAL PRiVATE FORWES: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PROSPECTS FOR
TE FTREu 348,348 (1996); Ian W. Hardie & Peter J. Parks, Program Enrollmentand Acreage

Response to RefirestationCost-SharingPrograms,72(2) LAND ECONOMICS 248 (1996).
12. Christopher D. Risbudt et aL, Cost-Efftctiveness of the 1979 ForestryIncentives Program,
81(5) J. FORESTRY 298,298 (1983).
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assistance programs have been effective in encouraging reforestation on
nonindustrial forest lands, other researchers question whether this impact
is carried through to timber supply.' In addition, others contend that
public assistance programs have been concentrated on a few large
landowners and have very little influence on forest landowner management decisions; that is, those landowners interested in timber management
would manage for timber even without the public assistance.'
We do not contest the success of forestry incentive programs in
supporting and, perhaps, stimulating some forms of forest resource
management on NIPF lands. Many landowners have used these programs
to help meet multiple use objectives on their personal property. However,
given the multiple use ownership goals of many forest landowners and the
fragmentation of NIPF lands, we believe that it is time to take a closer look
at incentive programs aimed specifically at increasing reforestation and
commercial timber harvesting from NIPF lands. We hope to stimulate
discussion on the effectiveness of the Forestry Incentive Programs in
prompting forest landowners to pursue timber management by looking at
the results from a recent NIPF landowner study in Arkansas.
Specifically, this article discusses the use of forestry incentives by
different groups of landowners identified in Arkansas. We then explore the
question of whether landowners interested in forest management would
have converted or planted acres regardless of offered incentives. Although
we discuss federal incentive programs in general, the focus is on the
Forestry Incentives Program (FIP), a program specifically targeted to longterm timber production and the impact (or lack thereof) on increasing
timber supply from NIPF lands.
METHODS
Data from this analysis came from a 1995 mail survey to 200 forest
landowners in each of 12 randomly assigned Arkansas counties. The

13. See generally Porterflield & Moak, supra note 2; James H. Gramann et al., A Logistic
Analysis of the Effects of Beliefs and Past Experiences on Management Plansfor Non-industrial
Private Forests, 20 J. ENVTL. MGmT. 347 (1985); Deborah A. Gaddis, Accmnplishments and
Prgram EvaluationsofForestry FinancialAssistance Program,in Minnesota Extension Service,
University of Minnesota, Symposium on Nonindustrial Private Forests Learning from the
Past, Prospects for the Future 357 (1996); David N. Wear & William F. Hyde, DistributiveIssues
in Forest Policy, in EMERG NG I%= INFOREST POLICY 297 (Peter N. Nemetz ed., 1992).
14. See ROYG. BOYD &WuiJAM F. HYDE, FORESMY SWOR INTVENoN: THE IMPACTS
oP PUBLIC RGUATION ON SOCIAL WELFA 48-89(1989); Worrel & Irland, supra note 1, at 209.
See generally John C. Bliss & A. Jeff Martin, How TreeFarmers View Management Incentives, 88
J.FoRESY 23 (1990).
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methodology and survey procedure have been previously described.'
Counties randomly selected for study are depicted in figure 1. These 2,400
landowners were mailed a questionnaire that requested information about
their land and personal objectives. The final response rate was 37 percent,
or a total of 866 filled-in questionnaires.

Ozark

Ouachita
Delta

Coastal
Plain
Figure 1. Arkansas' physiographic provinces; shaded
counties are those sampled in this study.
The survey form contained questions that probed four areas: stated
ownership objectives, property management intentions, previous management practices, and demographic factors that were used to characterize the
respondents. In order to allow the data to yield natural groups, seven
discrete clustering factors were selected. These criteria were chosen based
on previous studies.' The criteria included the following: use of the forest
land for a second home, response to a management statement regarding
the landowners position on a continuum between preservation and active

15. See Kluender & Walkingstick, supra note 10; Richard A. Williams et al, A
Characterization of the Non-Industrial Private Forest Landowners of Arkansas (unpublished
manuscript on file with the University of New Mexico School of Law Library).
16. See generally John L. Greene & Keith A. Blatner, Identifying Woodland Owner
CharacteristicsAssociated with Timber Management, 32 FOREST SCL 135 (1986); Gramann et al.,
supra note 13.
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management to maximize income, whether the landowner had sold timber
in the past, whether the landowner planned to sell timber in the future,
whether the landowner had lived in a rural or urban environment most of
his lifetime, landowner education level, and household income level. Once
stable dusters of landowners were established, a cross tab, chi-square
analysis of landowner dusters versus discrete question responses was
performed. 17 These results served to further characterize differences in the
ownership objectives, stated management objectives, declared management
actions, and reported demographic factors of the cluster types.
In the current study, chi-square analyses were run first, to
determine the frequency of use of incentives by landowner duster. A
second set of chi-square analyses probed the ownership objectives,
management philosophy, management actions, and demographic variables
associated with incentive users within each landowner duster.
RESULTS
In a previous report," the authors examined the character of four
different nonindustrial landowner typologies in the state of Arkansas.
These typologies were developed based on a K-means cluster analysis
using chi-square distancing. The dusters displayed strong independence
from each other. Additionally, within the clusters, landowner responses
showed little variation. The conclusions of that work indicated that
geographical location alone, as previously postulated, is a weak indicator
of landowner attitudes, ownership objectives, management propensity, and
inclination to harvest timber.1 9 Rather, ownership objectives, education, and
income are the most important factors in untying the Gordian knot of
understanding nonindustrial landowners." These landowners are briefly
described below.
Four Nonindustrial Landowner Groups
ClusterA: Timber Managers
Respondents in this duster were by far the most active in managing their forest land. They had sold timber in the past and had definite
plans for selling timber in the future. They also owned more forest land

17. See SYSTAT, SYSTAT 8.0 STATSICS 162-82 (1998).
18. Kluender & Walkingstick, supranote 10.
19. See Greene & Blatner, supra note 16, at 144; Williams et al., supra note 15, at 9.
20. Differences in the chi-square testing for all dustering and descriptive factors were
highly significant at the p =.01 level.
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than members of other duster groups. These individuals were fully
employed, very well educated, had high incomes, and were generally
urban-raised individuals who owned their land for timber investment,
personal recreation, and hunting lease purposes. Although interested in
making money from their forest land, they were also interested in
conserving the resource through sound forest management practices. They
did not live on their forest land and were more likely than the other groups
to employ someone to manage their forest property.
Cluster B: Resident Conservationists
These individuals lived on their own land and enjoyed its natural
scenic beauty. They had not sold timber and were not interested in selling
timber in the future. Ownership objectives of these respondents centered
around environmental concerns including providing wildlife habitat, living
in a rural environment, and owning personal "green space." They were
moderately educated, most having graduated from high school, some
having attended college. They had moderate to low household incomes.
Cluster C: The Affluent Weekenders
Respondents in this category did not live on their forest land, but
owned forest property as a place for a second home. Most had very high
incomes, were well educated, and were employed full time. They were
interested in providing wildlife habitat and passive recreational opportunities for themselves and friends. These individuals were more interested in
emphasizing the natural amenities of their land than in earning a return on
land investments. Some cluster members had sold timber in the past but
were not interested in doing so in the future.
ClusterD: Impoverished Rural Residents
Respondents in this category grew up in a rural environment,
probably inherited their land, were the least educated, had very low annual
incomes, and worked only part time, or were retired. Many had sold timber
in the past, but no forest management was being practiced on their
property. Members of this duster did not indicate a forest management,
land, or conservation ethic, but most likely would sell timber or do
anything else they could do with the land to generate additional income.
Who Uses Incentives?
Table 1 shows the use of incentives, including both tax and
assistance programs, by landowner duster. Although incentive programs
have been available for over 50 years, a relatively low percentage (27.5
percent) of landowners have ever availed themselves of the benefits.
Especially noteworthy is the low rate of incentive use by timber managers
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in Arkansas. Only 13.5 percent of these individuals had used any of the
offered incentives in the past. However, the number of responses in this
group was 72 percent higher than expected from the chi-square analysis.
Note that 50 percent of the incentive users were from this category. Other
dusters showed very low use and were far below their expected usage.
Additionally, tax incentives were used far less often than the cost-share
programs were used. Only 31 percent of the cost-share users reported also
using the taxation incentives.
Land ownership objectives often provide an understanding of
actions. Table 2 shows that incentive users were more likely to have
inherited their land, to have used it personally or leased it for hunting and
fishing, to be concerned about wildlife values, and to have held the land
primarily with the idea of growing trees. Incentive non-users, however,
were 26 percent less likely than expected to be interested in growing trees
or in using their land for active (hunting and fishing) recreational pursuits.
An analysis of stated management objectives showed that nonusers would more likely emphasize non-consumptive wildlife pursuits,
such as water, beauty, and enjoyment of nature, and would not use their
land to generate income (table 3). Incentive users, however, were 62 percent
more likely than expected to use their land to create income, with income
considerations being either their first or second ownership consideration.
Incentive users were less likely than non-users to live on their land
and much more likely to have help or to have someone else (consultants)
managing their property (table 4). Users were much more likely than nonusers to understand and use tax incentives. They were more likely to be in
a family or business partnership in owning their land, and they were 43
percent more likely to have definite plans to sell timber than non-users
(table 5). Finally, incentive users tended to be much better educated and
enjoy much higher incomes than non-users (table 6).
DISCUSSION
Incentive Users and Non-Users
The aggregate picture of the incentive user is of a person that is
better educated, has a higher income level than non-users, has stated goals
of creating an income stream from his property, is interested in active
recreational use of his land, owns the land to grow trees to sell, has sold
trees in the past (71 percent), and has formulated definite plans to sell
timber in the future (70 percent). Additionally, the incentive user has been
strongly identified as being a Timber Manager2' (table 1). The non-user

21. See Kluender & Walkingstick, supra note 10.
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may live on his property, tends to be less well educated, has a much lower
household income than incentive users, and owns the land to emphasize
wildlife, water considerations, and natural beauty. Except for the Impoverished Rural Residents, the non-user probably will not use the land as a
commercial forest, i.e., will not sell timber in the future.
Given the selected responses of the incentive users to the ownership objectives questions, it is obvious that incentive users would probably
engage in tree growing and commercial forestry, whether incentives were
present or not (table 2). This finding strongly agrees with a large group of
other researchers.' Additionally, since only 13.5 percent of the Timber
Managers used incentives, it is also obvious that incentives were not the
bait that lured them into active management. In our previous studyu we
determined that of our four cluster groups, the Timber Managers were 103
percent more likely to have owned their land with the intent of growing
trees for harvest than expected, versus the members of the other groups,
who collectively were much less likely than expected (-41 percent) to be
interested in harvesting timber. We conclude that the decision to grow and
sell timber is independent of offered incentives.
The Economics of Incentives
Forestry assistance programs have the effect of lowering investment costs for non-industrial landowners. The intent of this policy, as
conceived, was to solve a persistent problem of real price appreciation in
timber.' The reason for real price increase is demonstrated in figures 2 and
3. In figure 2, demand and supply are in equilibrium, the quantity Q, is
sufficient to meet existing demand; the market-clearing price is established
at P1. During the early years of the twentieth century, abundant forest
reserves provided more than adequate timber for all needs. However,
beginning in the early 1940s, concurrent with war demand, total timber
demand began to increase exponentially within the country. Figure 3
demonstrates the conditions that occurred. Note that as demand shifted
upward and to the right, a movement along the supply curve, S, occurred.
This led to increasing real prices for lumber and housing in the 1960s and
1970s, shown by the equilibrium price moving from e, to e2. Timber supply
is inherently inelastic in the long run.73 This condition exists because of the

22. See Bliss & Martin, supra note 14; Worrel & Irland, supranote 1; BOYD & HYDE, supra
note 14.
23. Kluender & Walkingstick, supranote 10.
24. See CUBBAGE ET AL, supranote 9, at 460.
25. See Richard A. Kluender & John C. Pickett, PublicPolicy Implicationsfor the Supply of
Pine Sawlogs, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 723 (1989).
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Figure 2. Supply and demand in equilibrium. Q,
is sufficient to meet existing demand at price P1 .
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S1

Price

Quantity
Figure 3. As demand shifts from D, to D 2 ,
the equilibrium price increases as the
market clearing point moves from el to e2.
For real price to remain constant, supply
must move outward from S, to S2 where the
equilibrium price at e1 equals the
equilibrium price at e3.
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long production cycle required for a tree to grow from seedling to sawtimber-sized trees that are used to produce lumber. In order to combat
increasing real prices and to stall the foreseeable shortfall of timber supply,
Congress passed the first incentive legislative in 1924 under the ClarkeMcNary Act.' The intent of this legislation, and all subsequent timber
incentive acts, was essentially to cause a long term outward shift in the
supply curve from S, to S2, thus providing more timber at all prices and
stabilizing the equilibrium price at its initial level (e3 = e). However, this
has never occurred and long term price appreciation for timber continues.'
Incentive users benefit directly from the use of cost-share and
taxation incentives in several ways. First, when cost-share (assistance) is
paid to the landowner, there is an immediate reduction in the up-front
investment cost, increasing the internal rate of return for those who later
sell timber. Second, federal tax law provides for the immediate recovery of
ten percent of invested dollars, excluding dollars used for cost sharing, in
the form of a tax credit. This is similar to other investment tax credits
enjoyed by industry and other investors. Finally, tax provisions also allow
the early amortization of reforestation and afforestation investment costs
over a seven-year period. While this early amortization has the negative
effect of reducing the basis of the investment that may be used in calculating the net taxable capital gain when the timber is harvested, it has an
immediate and positive effect in that the recovered amount is used, like
depreciation, against current income that is taxed at the marginal or highest
tax rate. The present net worth of the discounted basis value against capital
gains income is much less than using the recovered value to reduce current,
marginally taxed income.
Figure 4 depicts the use of incentives by a landowner. In the long
run, competitive equilibrium condition, average total cost is equal to price
(ATC = P), which, by definition, includes reinvestment cost. However, a
direct payment (cost-share) coupled with early amortization (tax incentives) results in a decline in average total cost to ATC2 . For those individuals who use incentives, a strong subsidy exists.

26.

See CiBBAGE er AL, supra note 9, at 457.

27. See Darius M. Adams, Long-Term Timber Supply Prospects in the United States: An
Analysis of Resources and Policies in Transition,in EMERGING IE
INFORESr POUCY 131,153
(Peter N. Nemetz ed., 1992).
28. See 26 US.C. § 194 (1994) amended by Act of Oct 14,1980, Pub. L No. 96451, Title In,

§ 301(a), 94 Stat. 1989 (the Packwood Amendment amends chapter 1, subchapter B, part VI
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (itemized deductions for individuals and corporations).
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 left these reforestation provisions in place. The Packwood
Amendment allows up to $10000 of capitalized reforestation costs each year to be eligible for
a 10 percent investment tax credit and a seven-year amortization of invested capital funds.
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ATC1
TT

AT2i

Price

Quantity
Figure 4. In the equilibrium condition average
total cost (ATC )equals price (P), which equals
average revenue (AR). But, with cost share
payments, ATC falls to ATC2 , and a subsidy
exists.
The findings from this limited study in Arkansas, and the previous
study conducted by the authors, strongly suggest that for those individuals
that plan to practice commercial forestry and to sell timber on a regular
basis, incentives are not a major decision factor. For those that do practice
commercial forestry, incentives provide an additional plum. For those
individuals that are not in the Timber Managers group and are not going
to participate in commercial forestry, incentives represent a fortuitous
rebate to those who are willing to take the cost-share handout. While some
non-managers will gladly take an offered incentive, no increase in longterm timber supply is likely to occur. This is a policy failure.
Should Incentives Be Continued?
Our tentative conclusion is that while direct assistance payments
may have induced some marginal owners to invest in the past, there is less
and less reason to offer assistance payments in the future. Although more
acres have been planted in trees, domestic timber supply is not expanding
rapidly enough to preclude real price appreciation and there is no
substantive evidence to indicate that cost share programs have slowed the
rate of price increase.
The subsidization of a few individuals who will invest in forestry
regardless of assistance constitutes a reward for doing what would have
been done anyway. The subsidization of individuals who will not aid in
expanding national timber supply is contrary to policy intent for the
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Forestry Incentives Program. As real price appreciation continues, timber
sellers will continue to enjoy increasing rates of return on their investments. For non-managers who occasionally make hardship timber sales,
increasing market prices are a windfall.
CONCLUSIONS
It is questionable whether the intent of forestry cost-share
programs, and especially Forestry Incentive Programs, has been met in the
past. Past and current research seems to indicate that cost-share programs
have not brought significant additional volumes of timber into the
marketplace. In the face of real price appreciation for timber, it is also
apparent that supply continues to fall short of demand.
The current wave of environmentalism, the desire by many
nonindustrial forest landowners to maintain "green space," and a rising
tide of affluence among the upper-middle class that permits second or
getaway homes, mitigates against commercial forest management. Rather,
for many individuals the ends of forest management are aesthetic
experiences, pristine air and water, and a Camelot where insistent
telephones are controlled. For them, pressure to harvest trees is anathema.
For these individuals, cost-share and tax incentives will never provide a

lever sufficiently long enough to pry loose standing timber.
For forest managers committed to the long-term cycle of harvest,

regeneration, and forest maintenance, incentives serve as a positive
behavior reinforcement for actions that probably would have been
accomplished with or without the incentive. Little is gained here by cost-

share expenditures, except the provision of a group subsidy. The beneficiaries are the timber managers who enjoy an increased internal rate of return
on their investments. From this group no additional timber is forthcoming,
i.e., they would produce the same amount of timber with or without the
incentive.
The policy implications are clear. Cost-share incentives have not
brought significant additional amounts of timber into the market place and
do not appear to have stemmed real price appreciation of timber. Policies
surrounding assistance payments should be carefully reviewed.

